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Abstract 
 
 
mall and medium-sized enterprises, in aggregate, are the biggest employer in most countries, 
accounting for about two thirds of all employment in the UK, more than 70% in Germany and 
about 80% in Japan. Small firms are largely dependent on bank credit for external funding. This paper 
examines the question whether there is a significant relationship between bank size and customer size 
and whether bigger or smaller banks are more likely to be helpful to small and very small businesses 
in terms of providing loans. Using data on over 14,000 active and inactive U.S banks of all sizes, 
from 1994 to 2013, thus utilising over 178,000 observations, we conduct hitherto the largest empirical 
examination of this question, applying a new and superior methodology that resolves prior 
controversies. The results indicate an inverse relationship between bank size and the propensity of 
banks to lend to small businesses. The relationship is robust and survives a number of rigorous 
specification checks. The result helps decide a long-standing debate about the influence of bank size 
on bank finance for small firms. Policy implications are discussed, such as the importance of a diverse 
and decentralised banking sector that includes a large number of small banks, such as exists in the 
US (but not other countries, such as the UK), in order to help overcome growth constraints on small 
and micro businesses. 
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 1. Introduction 
There has been increasing interest in financial analysis that distinguishes between large firms on the one 
hand, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on the other and micro firms as a third option. 
Ramalho and Vidigal da Silva (2009) examined capital structure of these differently sized firms and 
found that firm size is negatively related to the proportion of debt used by firms. On the other hand, there 
has been much interest in the question to what extent bank size matters – especially when it comes to 
network effects, contagion and systemic risk (see, for instance, Siebenbrunner, Sigmund and Kerbl, 
2017). Policy-makers have been concerned with the question to what extent bank size matters when it 
comes to bank lending to SMEs and micro-businesses. In this paper we present the results of the largest 
empirical study to date on this question. 
Especially small and microbusinesses are known to face barriers to growth that are mainly due to a lack 
of access to of finance (Kent and Dacin, 2013; Cook, 1999; Pissarides, 1999; Hessels and Parker, 2013). 
Pissarides (1999) finds in a large empirical study on Eastern European SMEs that “credit constraints 
constitute one of the main obstacles to growth of SMEs". Many entrepreneurs resort to bank financing 
over venture capital financing in order to retain full control of their ventures, and retain strong incentives 
(De Bettignies and Duchene, 2015). 
At the same time, since the 2008 banking crisis many entrepreneurs have been quoted in the financial 
press to the effect that the big banks have not been helpful to them and, specifically, are failing to provide 
funding to entrepreneurs. Many policy-makers have since emphasised the need to increase bank lending 
to SMEs. Riding and Haines (2001) already argued that government interventions in the credit markets, 
to facilitate credit to entrepreneurial start-ups, expansion of existing SMEs and SME survival, are 
important for economic development and job creation. Example for such interventions include the loan 
guarantee programmes in Canada and the United States and similar schemes in Japan, Korea, the United 
Kingdom and Germany. In recent years in the U.K, in addition to the grant, loan and government 
guarantee schemes (operated by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy), a number 
of other government initiatives have been launched to stimulate bank lending to SMEs. These include 
Project Merlin (HM Treasury) and the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS, operated by the Bank of 
England). Meanwhile, the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) has been flagging up the continuing 
unmet demand for borrowing by SMEs. Thus policy-makers and business representatives recognise 
problems with the funding of small businesses and entrepreneurs in many countries, while in others, such 
as Germany, this problem does not seem significant, even after the 2008 crisis.  
In the United Kingdom, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills had tasked an entrepreneur 
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(as 'Serial Entrepreneur in Residence' in 2013-14, Mr Lawrence Tomlinson) with looking into the 
practices of the big banks, in order to see whether they discriminate against small firms.2 His report was 
critical of big banks, but has been criticised for its focus on case studies and lack of quantitative analysis.  
It is well established in the scholarly literature that SMEs are more dependent on bank lending than other 
sources of external funding (e.g. Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). Recent developments in financial 
markets have widened the spectrum of entrepreneurial funding opportunities, with peer-to-peer lending 
and crowdfunding (Belleflamme et al., 2014) growing in importance, but the question concerning the 
optimal size of financial services provider (and hence structure of the financial sector) for the main 
employer (small and medium-sized enterprises) remains largely open. In this paper we ask whether big 
banks are less prone to support small firms, and whether small banks are more likely to lend to small 
firms.  
Many studies have investigated the link between the organisational structure of financial institutions and 
lending to small businesses. These studies developed a conventional wisdom that larger banks devote a 
smaller proportion of their lending portfolios to small businesses than smaller banks (e.g. Berger and 
Udell, 1995; Keeton, 1995; Berger et al., 1998; Strahan and Weston, 1998; Haynes et al., 1999; Berger 
and Udell, 2002; Berger et al., 2005; Gilje 2017). Others have explicitly examined the role of bank size 
(Bertay et al., 2013), though without considering customer size. 
The main theoretical argument of these studies centres on differing lending technologies adopted by 
banks of different size: large banks are said to enjoy comparative advantages in ‘hard information’ 
lending (or ‘transactions lending’), thus targeting more transparent and large firms, while small banks 
have comparative advantages in ‘soft information’ lending (or ‘relationship lending’) and thus are more 
interested in lending to small, opaque firms. Because of the informational opaqueness associated with 
small businesses, relationship lending is regarded as one of the most important technologies through 
which banks provide credit to small businesses (e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002). Thus large banks may be 
disadvantaged at relationship lending to small firms. This is said to be due to difficulties in processing 
‘soft information’, which is problematic to quantify, verify and transmit through the communication 
channels of organisationally complex large banks, causing additional expenses and problems (e.g. agency 
problems) due to Williamson-type (1988) managerial diseconomies, which may also occur in 
transactions lending (e.g. Stein, 2002). On the other hand, the comparative advantages of small banks in 
lending to informationally opaque small businesses may be attributed to the superior ability of small 
banks to avoid managerial diseconomies. Additionally, small banks are more often located closer to their 
potential relationship clients, offering smoother communications that enable the bank management to 
                                                     
2 see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/you-re-hired-entrepreneurs-in-residence-to-advise-government  
collect and transmit more easily ‘soft information’ about the local market and the firm characteristics. 
Small banks with fewer layers of management hierarchy may mitigate contracting problems between the 
bank managers and the loan officers (e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002). 
However, Berger and Udell (2006) question this conventional wisdom for being “oversimplified”, by 
failing to distinguish between transactions lending technologies, and viewing them as a single 
homogenous lending technology used mainly by large banks dealing with informationally transparent 
firms. They develop a theoretical framework postulating how financial structures affect the feasibility 
and profitability of the different lending technologies, and the effects of these technologies on small 
business credit availability. According to this framework, only the financial statement lending technology 
satisfies such characteristics, while the rest of transactions lending technologies (e.g. small business 
credit scoring, fixed-asset lending, leasing, asset-based lending, and factoring) may be used to target 
informationally opaque borrowers. This provides a note of caution against drawing a conclusive answer 
to the question of whether a large market presence of small banks is essential for small businesses to 
obtain credit. Similarly, Petersen and Rajan (2002) claim that the use of information and communication 
technologies (e.g. credit scoring) has made local information previously only possessed by small banks 
less valuable in assessing small business loans, reducing the advantage that small local banks may have 
enjoyed in small business lending, and made it easier for large banks to approach small businesses 
(Berger et al., 2014).  
Nevertheless, researchers such as Brickley (2003) or Butler et al., (2016) provide justifications for an 
important role for small banks, such as borrowers considered poor credit and small loan requests. This 
includes the literature on the functional distance between bank branches and their headquarters as a 
critical factor affecting credit availability to SMEs (Alessandrini et al., 2009; Cotugno et al., 2017) and 
hinder innovations by SMEs (Alessandrini et al., 2010). That is to say, in markets where local banking 
is more dispersed and functionally distant, SMEs become more credit-rationed and less innovative. On 
the other hand, the impact of large bank presence on SMEs introducing innovations was found to be 
insignificant by Alessandrini et al. (2010). Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) reveal that lead banks offer 
smaller loans at a higher interest rate to more culturally distant borrowers and also require more collateral. 
A study from Poland, by Hasan et al., (2017), highlights the importance of local cooperative banks in 
facilitating credit to SMEs at a lower cost and contributing to the growth of SMEs. 
Due to such counter-arguments and contradictory or ambiguous empirical results (e.g. Berger and Udell, 
2002; Petersen and Rajan, 2002), it can be said that the question whether SME lending is best or most 
often done by small banks, or whether large banks are doing the job just as well, remains open. In order 
to contribute to this debate, we have analysed the empirical evidence from the world’s largest and most 
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diverse banking system, that of the USA. We analysed the relationship between bank size and small 
business lending. The degree to which the findings in other studies can be generalised may be 
questionable and their methodology to gauge the bank propensities to small business lending may be 
considered faulty. This paper thus contributes to the literature in two ways: (1) Unlike most of the papers 
that have employed survey data, our bank-level dataset consists of 14,453 domestic U.S depositary 
institutions insured by the FDIC, that is, approximately all U.S depositary institutions over two decades, 
utilising over 173,000 observations. Accordingly, the results can be generalised across the USA. (2) In 
this paper, improvements of two measures of bank propensities to lend to small and micro businesses are 
presented, which address the weakness in prior work of potential biases due to the “denominator effect” 
and an imprecision in the calculations of propensity ratios, as identified by Berger et al., (2007). 
This paper is structured as follows: In the next section, a review is presented of the literature on bank 
size, bank consolidation, propensity measures and small business lending. The following section 
describes the data and the methodology utilised in our study. After this, results are discussed and further 
subjected to robustness tests. The final section concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Two strands can be distinguished from the extant literature of bank size and small business lending. Firstly, 
a number of studies have investigated the extent to which banks of different sizes approach and lend to 
small businesses. Secondly, another strand of research has examined the extent to which bank size 
resulting from bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As), affect small business lending.  
Concerning the first strand of literature, it has been argued that small banks allocate a higher proportion 
of their loan portfolio to small businesses than large banks do (e.g. Berger et al., 1995), whereas larger 
banks charge small businesses lower loan interest rates and less frequently require collateral from them 
(e.g. Berger and Udell, 1996; Carter et al., 2004). Here it is argued that a lower loan rate implies less 
opaque borrowers. Haynes et al., (1999) find that large banks are more likely to lend to larger and older 
small businesses and hence more secured ones. On the other hand, small banks are more willing to serve 
micro businesses, mainly through relationship lending as an advantageous technology that is inherent in 
small banks’ lending to small businesses (Berger and Udell, 1995). A central interest of the literature is 
the process by which banks of different sizes approach small businesses. For instance, a study by Cole et 
al., (2004, also 1999), lends support to the conventional wisdom that large banks are more tied to 
transactions lending to control for agency problems, while small banks rely more on relationship lending. 
Recently, Beck et al., (2017) find that foreign banks follow large banks with more transactions lending, 
and their pricing is based more on credit ratings and collateral pledges. Further, Berger et al., (2005) assert 
that small banks have longer and more exclusive relationships, deal more personally with borrowers, and 
are more effective in alleviating credit constraints than large banks, and therefore small banks tend 
predominantly to lend to smaller, financially distressed firms. That is, small local banks are superior in 
channelling funds to SMEs and microbusinesses. For instance, Gilje (2017) documents that a positive local 
credit supply shock, resulting from an increase in local bank deposits, significantly increases the number 
of business establishments in the United States. Uchida (2011) observes a partial shift from 
collateral/guarantee lending to relationship lending following the banking crisis in Japan. In this context, 
Shimizu (2012) contends that in the local credit market in Japan a greater amount of non-performing loans 
(NPL) is held by small banks than large banks, and that such NPLs at small banks are associated with a 
lower number of bankrupt unincorporated firms or small businesses with a very small number of 
employees. However, formal enforcement actions contribute the financial safety and the soundness of 
banks, reducing both the risk-weighted assets and the NPLs ratios of targeted banks (Delis et al., 2016). 
Unlike other studies, Berger et al., (2007) explore the impact of market size structure (i.e. the shares of 
different bank sizes in the local market) on credit supply to small businesses. Their findings contradict the 
above conventional wisdom and supports the hypothesis in Berger and Udell (2006), suggesting that large 
banks are not disadvantaged in lending to small or informationally opaque businesses, rather they may 
have alternative transactions lending technologies to approach small and opaque businesses. Berger et al., 
(2007) also find that small business loan prices (borrowing rates) are significantly negatively affected by 
a larger market presence of large banks, but not by the bank’s size itself. More recently, Berger and Black 
(2011) assert that 1) the comparative advantages of large banks in transactions lending vary across 
technologies, lending support to Berger and Udell (2006)’s framework against grouping transactions 
lending technologies, 2) not all of those advantages appear to be monotonically increasing as firm size 
increases, and 3) small banks may have a comparative advantage in relationship lending, however, the 
strongest advantage is found for lending to the largest firms. Accordingly, small banks may not be superior 
in serving small businesses. Further evidence to contradict the conventional wisdom is presented by 
Ongena et al., (2011) from Turkey. They report that small firms are more interested in dealing with large, 
domestic, private banks than small banks. They speculate that this may be due to the extensive influence 
of loan officers at large banks in Turkey (Benvenuti et al., 2009). 
An important aspect in relationship lending is the role that loan officers can play in producing soft 
information about their small business clients. This role may differ according to bank type and size. Uchida 
et al., (2012) stress that loan officers do play a critical role in relationship lending; in particular, loan 
officers in small banks produce more soft information than those at large banks. However, the superiority 
of small banks in relationship lending is not due to the inability of large banks to produce soft information, 
rather it is due to greater efforts exerted by loan officers at small banks to produce soft information, and 
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greater incentives granted by less organisationally complex banks (Stein, 2002), and a tendency by large 
banks to focus on transactions lending instead. Moreover, a reduction in the number of loan officers, due 
to permanent or temporary leave, interrupts the personalised relationship between the borrowers and the 
bank. Such interruption leads to loss in soft information and, consequently, reduction in the number of 
new loans, especially at banks that are specialised in SME lending (Drexler and Schoar, 2014). 
A small number of cross-country studies exists in the empirical literature. De La Torre et al., (2010) 
consider 12 developed and developing countries. They conclude that all types of private banks are 
essentially interested in lending to small businesses and view them as a profitable market segment. Yet, 
banks do not rely solely on relationship lending when serving small businesses. In contrast, Mudd (2012) 
uses data from 71 countries to emphasise the importance of small banks in lending to small businesses 
through the implementation of the relationship lending technology, suggesting that a greater market 
presence of small banks in total lending increases the credit access for small businesses. In a recent cross-
country study, Kysucky and Norden (2016) find that the beneficial effects of relationship lending vary 
across countries and increase with higher levels of bank competition. The greatest benefits for borrowers 
are found in the U.S, although SMEs are less important than in Germany, France, Italy and Japan. 
The effect of bank consolidation on small business lending is an important subject that has been intensively 
investigated over the past two decades. To start with, Peek and Rosengren (1996) conclude that most banks 
that are involved in M&A activities reduced credits to small businesses in New England. This reduction 
occurs (e.g. for efficiency reasons, see Akkus et al., 2015) when most large and distant acquirers recast 
the targets’ business strategies according to the acquirers’ and consider them as junior partners (Keeton, 
1995), such as modifications in the loan terms and reassessment of the lending portfolios (Bonaccorsi di 
Patti and Gobbi, 2007). The negative impact on small business lending is stronger with out-of-state urban 
acquirers (Keeton, 1995), and when many of pre-merger relationships with small borrowers are terminated 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2007). Since most small businesses are single-relationship borrowers, 
Degryse et al., (2011) argue that borrowing firms which hold single-relationships with target banks are 
more likely to be dropped and, consequently, being deprived of credits in Belgium. These dropped firms 
show a deteriorating performance and a higher rate of bankruptcy compared to others that do not face 
discontinuation of relationships or those that switch to other banks. In view of that, large borrowers, which 
build multiple relationships with lenders, are more likely to survive the consequences of bank mergers.  
Moreover, Berger et al., (1998) employ a large sample of almost all U.S M&As (i.e. 6,000 M&As) that 
took place between 1977 and 1992. The static analysis suggests a decrease in small business loans, whereas 
the dynamic investigation shows that such decline is mostly offset by other lenders in the same market 
and partially by recasting post-consolidation policies toward small business lending. In a later study from 
Italy, Sapienza (2002) reports that small borrowers tend to seek financial alternatives to satisfy their credit 
demands following the mergers of their banks. Together, large acquirers tend to reduce their lending to 
small borrowers subsequent to the acquisition of small banks. Nevertheless, such decline is offset in the 
market after three years of M&A events (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2007), while Craig and Hardee 
(2007) claim that it is partially offset by non-bank institutions.  
A number of studies have taken a far more positive view of M&As on small business lending. Strahan and 
Wetson (1996) document evidence of no effects of bank M&As on lending to small businesses, however, 
in a subsequent study Strahan and Wetson (1998) find an increase in such lending following small bank 
consolidations. Along the same line of argument, Peek and Rosengren (1998) argue that small business 
lending increases when the acquirer is small or the acquirer has a greater share of small business loans 
than that of its target. On the other hand, small business lending decreases when the acquirer is large and 
not specialised in small business lending. Jayaratne and Wolken (1999) do not observe a significant 
decrease in the probability of a small business obtaining a line of credit as results of a reduced presence 
of small banks in the market. In a deeper attempt at examining the changes in post-consolidation lending 
policies, Erel (2009) concludes that banks, after mergers, charge lower interest rates especially for small 
loans. The reduction in spreads can be attributed to scale and/or scope efficiencies in the long-run, as well 
as efficiency gains in the short term, thanks to the mergers. Accordingly, larger acquirers do not 
significantly reduce small business lending by smaller targets. Rather, they grant greater amounts of loans 
to small businesses, implying a positive effect of mergers on small business lending. More recently, 
Jagtiani et al. (2016) argue that large banks have filled the gap in small business lending following the 
decline in the number of small community banks as a result of M&As. They conclude that the acquisition 
of small banks by larger banks contributes to a sounder and safer banking system. Unlike our paper, 
Jagtiani et al. adopt the ratio of small business loans to total assets to measure the small business lending 
propensity. Another angle is to investigate the effect of M&As on the rate of new business formations. 
Again, the studies yield diverging results: some argue this is beneficial, others find the opposite.3  
 
3. Weaknesses in the Literature and How to Address Them 
The significant amount of controversies in the above reviewed large literature demonstrate that further 
research is needed to shed new light on the underlying question, while addressing the likely causes of the 
                                                     
3 Black and Strahan (2002) find that the decline in the share of small banks, as a result of bank consolidations, helps entrepreneurs and positively 
impacts the formation of new businesses in the United States. This may occur, as previously stressed by Strahan and Wetson (1998), as a result of 
size-related diversification which reduces delegated monitoring costs incurred by small banks to build long-term relationships with their 
borrowers. In contrast, Francis et al., (2008) conclude that both in-market and out-of-market consolidations by large acquirers hamper the 
formation of new businesses. However, the adverse effects become positive in the long-term. Yet, consolidations by small or medium-sized 
acquirers are found to have a positive impact on small business formation and local entrepreneurial activities. 
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controversies. We hold that most contradictory findings can be attributed to factors such as the sample 
size and data source, but also to the proxy measures employed and the empirical model adopted. There are 
at least three fundamental issues, and ours is the first research addressing all of them: 
1) The empirical literature relies primarily on data taken from surveys (e.g. NSSBF survey for the US) 
of small business borrowing activities (e.g. Cole, 1998) or the Survey of Incorporated Businesses in 
Japan (e.g. Uchida, 2011). Others, such as Berger et al., (1995), Peek and Rosengren (1998) and 
McNulty et al., (2011), take samples of bank lending activity, such as the so-called Call Reports. 
Moreover, a number of researchers form samples by matching small business borrowers with their 
lenders, such as matching data from the NSSBF survey and the Call Reports (e.g. Haynes et al., 1999; 
Berger and Black, 2011). It is possible that, for instance, the Survey of Small Firm Finance used by 
Berger and Black (2007) is not fully representative of the population of all small businesses with 
commercial bank loans found in the Call Report data, due to possible survivorship bias and probable 
exclusion of very small businesses. Results from these studies may be questioned concerning the 
degree to which their results can be generalised and whether there are any inherent biases. 
By contrast, as will be seen below, in our Call Report data we consider all small business loans made 
by all commercial banks that were active at some time during the observation period (1994 to 2013). 
This almost certainly explains the difference between their interpretation of the data and ours. An 
important example is the widely used NSSBF survey which is conducted only once every five years 
and may neglect many of the micro firms. By relying on it, many researchers do not account for the 
changes in lending propensity over time and may face questions concerning sampling bias. As we aim 
to examine small business lending patterns from the banks’ perspective, we collect a representative 
sample of virtually all depositary institutions in the U.S over 20 years.  
2) As for the proxy measures employed, Uchida (2011), for instance, criticises other studies (e.g. Berger 
et al., 2005; Uchida et al., 2008; and Berger and Black, 2011) for merely relying on measures of 
contract terms and the relationship strength between banks and firms to identify lending technologies 
rather than focusing on factors that drive such terms and strength. He collects data on loan screening 
from Japan and conducts a factor analysis in order to study the impact of small business characteristics 
on loan underwriting decisions. Yet, his data on the loan screening and the bank process of credit 
evaluation are merely taken from borrowers’ perceptions. Further, Shen et al., (2009) reach 
contradictory results when using different measures of bank size. That is, bank size does not have 
effects on lending when measured by total assets, whereas it does have an effect when it is measured 
by the number of levels in the decision-making hierarchy.  
A number of studies rely primarily on the ratio of small business loans to total assets as an indicator 
of bank propensity to lend to small businesses (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1996; Berger et al., 1998; Peek 
and Rosengren, 1998; Strahan and Weston, 1998; Akhavein et al., 2005; Frame et al., 2004; Laderman, 
2008; Jagtiani et al., 2016). For instance, Berger et al., (1998) employ this lending propensity indicator 
to find a negative impact of M&As on small business lending in the U.S. Besides, Peek and Rosengren 
(1998) assert that small business lending propensities at target banks follow the same pattern as the 
acquirers following the M&As, but those propensities do not change when the acquirers are also small 
banks. In other words, they find that an acquiring bank tends to impose its business model on the 
target, in effect reconstructing the target bank in its own image. Their results show that the ratio of 
small business loans to total assets for the consolidated institution converges toward the pre-merger 
ratio of the acquirer (see also Karceski et al., 2005 on Norway). These findings, of imposing a new 
small business lending pattern, provide strong evidence that the reduced lending to small businesses 
is mainly due to changes in bank policy or, in other words, changes in the propensity to lend to small 
businesses. 
On the other hand, Berger et al., (2007) question the importance of lending propensities. They suggest 
that perhaps large banks have lower ratios because the denominator is expanded (i.e. growth 
opportunities) and not because the numerator is contracted. Their results are based on matching firm 
data from the National Survey of Small Business Finance and bank data from the call reports and the 
Summary of Deposits. There are 648 matched bank-firm observations. By contrast, we look at 
virtually all small business loans made by banks by considering all usable call report data reported by 
the FDIC. Clearly, lending propensities are important because they are a reflection of major 
differences in the business models of large and small banks. These differences determine the effect of 
specific mergers on individual small business borrowers at individual banks, as the relevant literature 
has shown.  
Berger et al., (2007) claim that large banks are more capable, and less legally constrained than small 
banks, of expanding their assets by making large business loans or other investments. Such asset 
expansion shrinks the ratio of small business loans to total assets, as a result of a larger denominator 
rather than a smaller numerator. To correct for this problem, a few studies alternatively use the ratio 
of small business loans to total loans (e.g. Shen et al., 2009; McNulty et al., 2011). The latter ratio 
ameliorates the effect of the denominator that is inherent in the former ratio by excluding other specific 
large bank assets, (i.e. investment assets, trading account assets and other assets that would be a more 
significant portion of large bank balance sheets than small bank balance sheets), which are more likely 
to amount to a substantial portion of large bank assets. The ratio of small business loans to total loans 
is calculated by Shen et al., (2009) and McNulty et al., (2013), as follows: 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 
(𝑖. 𝑒. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
 
However, this correction may not be sufficient, as this ratio may include loans which are provided by 
banks that are more specialised in other types of lending (e.g. real estate lending) or more capable of 
providing large-scale loans to other depository institutions. As a result, the inclusion of these loans is 
translated in the ratio of small business loans to total loans as a low propensity (i.e. due to larger 
denominator resulting from larger total loans or smaller numerator resulted from smaller amount of 
small business loans), erroneously showing them as being unwilling to lend to small businesses. 
Therefore, the literature has not done enough to ameliorate this problem.  
As solution we suggest that this can and should be done by defining the propensity to lend to small 
firms as the ratio of small business loans to total business loans. Our improved ratio excludes other 
non-business loans (i.e. personal loans, property loans, agricultural loans, credit card loans, loans to 
depository institutions and other non-commercial and industrial loans), as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 
(𝑖. 𝑒. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +
𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 +
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
 
 
 
3) As argued by Berger et al., (2007) concerning the denominator problem, large banks are also more 
capable of expanding and diversifying their lending portfolios. For example, large banks are more 
capable of providing large loans to other financial institutions that small banks cannot provide. Thus, 
including those types of loans in the denominator may also shrink the propensity ratio for large banks, 
showing them unwilling to lend to small businesses.  
We take the concern of Berger et al., (2007) regarding the denominator effect further and eliminate 
assets that may cause biases in lending propensities between large and small banks. This is the 
approach used for the empirical work presented below. 
 
This paper, as also asserted by McNulty et al., (2013), does not say that a higher propensity ratio at small 
banks necessarily implies that small banks provide a larger volume of small business loans than large 
banks. However, it shows that small banks are more specialised in delivering loans to small businesses, 
and can pass on the collective benefits of this specialisation if there are many of them. In other words, 
several independent small banks are likely together to lend more to small and micro businesses than a 
single bank whose balance sheet is as large as the sum of the small banks.  
4. Data and Methodology 
Our primary source of data is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC):  
“The FDIC collects, corrects, updates and stores Reports of Condition and Income data submitted to the FDIC by all 
insured national and state non-member commercial banks and state-chartered savings banks on a quarterly basis. Reports 
of Condition and Income data are a widely used source of timely and accurate financial data regarding a bank’s condition 
and the results of its operations” (FDIC).  
Our dataset includes all domestically active and inactive U.S depositary institutions that have reported to 
the FDIC over the past 20 years from 1994 to 2013. From these reports, data on their business loans are 
available. This gives us a dataset of 14,453 depositary institutions in an unbalanced panel dataset of 173,719 
observations.4 We believe this is the largest, longitudinally the longest and, hence, the most representative 
dataset in the extant empirical literature. Unlike other variables, loans to small businesses are only reported 
as of June 30; thus we have to use yearly data for all variables. We calculated the ratio of small business 
loans to total business loans and the ratio of micro business loans to total business loans (SBLTBL and 
MBLTBL, respectively). 
Additionally, as a robustness check, we seek to control for potentially large variations in the competitive 
environment and specialisation of banks. We thus construct a subsample of banks that specialise in 
commercial lending only and operate in the largest U.S cities (those with a population of more than 
500,000). This leaves us with 912 banks headquartered in 34 cities, which operate in a more homogeneous 
environment with respect to market and economic conditions. This eliminates any unobserved regional or 
market effects, which are not captured by the control variables in the main regressions.  
4.1.  Definition of Variables 
As noted in the literature review, and taking into consideration the argument of Berger and Udell (2006) 
concerning the ratio of small business loans to total assets, our key dependent variables to measure the 
propensity of bank lending to small micro businesses are: 
                                                     
4 For simplicity, we use the term “bank” for all types of depositary institutions reporting to the FDIC. 
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1) the ratio of Small Business Loans to Total Business Loans (SBLTBL), and  
2) the ratio of Micro Business Loans to Total Business Loans (MBLTBL).  
Small business loans are defined by the FDIC as the amount of currently outstanding commercial and 
industrial loans with original amounts less than $1,000,000 held at domestic bank offices. In addition, we 
consider loans with original amounts of less than $100,000 to be micro business loans. Since a small 
business definition is based on the size of the loan (Call Report definition), we name small business loans 
with original amounts of less than $100,000 as ‘micro business loans’ (i.e. loans granted to the smallest of 
the small businesses).  
Several researchers have adopted the FDIC definition of small business loans, such as Keeton (1995), 
Strahan and Wetson (1998), Peek and Rosengren (1998), Carter and McNulty (2005), Carter et al., (2004), 
and Berger and Black (2011). Although, in theory, the data is based on the loan size and not the company 
size, it is reasonable to interpret the way that the FDIC and the literature have done: Because of the due-
diligence and transactions costs, it is unlikely for large companies to take out very small loans, while small 
companies cannot take out large loans. Further evidence for the accuracy of this approximation comes 
from the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) data, according to which on average 93% of small business 
loans amount to $100,000 or less.5 In addition, primary surveys have established a close correspondence 
between loan size and the size of the borrower.6  
Our key explanatory variable is the logarithm of total bank assets. It is defined as the sum of all assets 
owned by the institution, including cash, loans, securities, bank premises and other assets.7 Since our study 
is based solely on data about banks’ activities, we include a number of explanatory variables to control for 
other factors which may affect the credit supply to small businesses. These control variables are consistent 
with previous studies (e.g. Peek and Rosengren, 1998; DeYoung et al., 1999; Carter and McNulty, 2005) 
and are discussed below. 
Regional Bank-Market Characteristics; firstly, we use a variable for regional banking market 
concentration that is represented by a bank’s share in the market for deposits (it indicates a bank presence 
in the local market). This is computed as the share of deposits that is domestically held by a bank in the 
state where it is headquartered, as a percentage of all domestically held deposits in the state. Petersen and 
Rajan (1995) suggest that small banks in less competitive markets have a greater incentive to invest in 
loan relationships because there is less chance that the borrower will switch to a competing lender. Prior 
                                                     
5 The CRA requires banks with asset size greater than $300 million to report their small business loans. 
6 For instance, according to the 1989 National Survey of Small Business Finance, 80 percent of loans to businesses with less than $1 million in 
annual sales amounted to less than $100,000 each (Board of Governors). Additionally, earlier surveys have yielded similar results (Keeton, 1995). 
7 This total does not include off-balance-sheet items. 
research shows that local market share of large banks is a powerful predictor of the lending bank size (e.g., 
Berger et al., 2007; Berger and Black, 2011), which suggests that firms may generally choose an institution 
based on convenience. The effect of market concentration may be either favourable or unfavourable for 
small business borrowers (e.g., see Scott and Dunkelberg, 2003). Secondly, a dummy variable takes the 
value of ‘1’ if a banks’ headquarters is located in an MSA and ‘0’ if a bank is not headquartered in the 
MSA. This variable indicates the level of market competition where banks are active (i.e. urbanised areas, 
as in MSA, show higher market competition than rural Non-MSA ones). Carter and McNulty (2005) argue 
that relative to small banks, large banks are more likely to operate in more competitive metropolitan 
markets, are more likely to be affiliated with a bank holding company, make relatively fewer small 
business loans but more credit card loans. Moreover, Akhigbe and McNulty (2003) report that 57% of 
small U.S banks are in non-metropolitan areas, so the typical small bank should have greater investment 
in small-firm relationships, which could give them an advantage in their lending activities. Accordingly, 
we expect a negative effect of the MSA variable on SME lending propensities. (Source: Summary of 
Deposits by FDIC, 2014).  
Regional Economic Characteristics; the logarithm of GDP per capita (the Gross Domestic Product per 
capita) is added to account for the effect of local economic activities and business cycles on credit demand 
and supply. Unlike Black and Starhan (2002) who use the personal income growth, we use the GDP per 
capita of the state in which the bank is headquartered. The use of state-level GDP per capita and state-
level deposit share may not be sufficiently representative of the actual bank local market. However, using 
county-level or MSA-level data (for Non-MSA areas, a county has to be considered instead) is too small, 
particularly for those multi-county banks (they form over 50% of the banks included in my dataset). Banks 
in more developed markets seek large deals with large firms and tend to invest in less costly loans to 
financially safer firms, while banks are more inclined to issue small business loans in less developed 
markets, especially through relationship lending. It is expected that large banks would more often lend to 
firms with high ROE relative to small banks (e.g. Rice and Strahan, 2010; Berger and Black, 2011). 
Therefore, bank lending propensities to micro and small businesses are expected to be lower in states with 
higher GDP per capita. (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA). 
Bank Specific Characteristics; we add a dummy variable for banks that are regulated by a multibank 
holding company. This identifies a bank’s autonomy in lending policies, since many holding companies 
may impose their policies on their smaller subsidiaries. Keeton (1995) argues that small banks affiliated 
with bank holding companies may act more like large banks, suggesting a lower propensity to lend to 
micro and small businesses (as this paper hypothesises).  
In addition to the above controls, we include the following five variables to control for bank health, 
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performance, and fundamental risk characteristics (all variables are collected from the FDIC, 2014): 
1) The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, defined as loans and leases 90 days or more past due 
plus loans in nonaccrual status, as a percent of gross loans and leases (e.g. Peek and Rosengren, 1998). A 
greater share of non-performing loans is expected to have a negative impact on the bank lending policy to 
small, informationally opaque firms.  
2) The leverage ratio, defined as the Tier 1 (core) capital as a percent of average total assets minus 
ineligible intangibles. A bank that relies more on debt-based capital is less likely to be engaged in risky 
lending (e.g. SME lending), and more willing to approve loans to large, transparent companies (e.g. Peek 
and Rosengren, 1998). Thus, the bank propensity to lend to micro and small businesses is expected to 
decrease as a result of a higher leverage ratio. 
3) Bank profitability is measured by the return on assets (ROA) ratio (e.g. Peek and Rosengren, 1998). 
This variable is defined as net income after taxes and extraordinary items as a percent of average total 
assets. Bank profitability is typically used as a control variable to capture any link between bank 
performance and the local supply of credit (Carter et al., 2004). 
4) The ratio of interest income to earning assets, defined as total interest income as a percent of average 
earning assets. This ratio is used to control for lending performance (e.g. Carter and McNulty, 2005). 
Improved lending performance is expected to have a positive impact on the share of small and micro 
business loans. 
5) The logarithm of the bank age, which is calculated by subtracting the year of bank establishment from 
the current year of observation plus one year i.e. logarithm (age +1). To be compatible with the lending 
date, the first four bank specific control variables are annualised over the past four quarters prior to 30th 
of June of each year. This measure captures whether a bank changes its small business lending behaviour 
as it becomes older. This variable allows us to test the extent to which bank age has a negative effect on 
small business lending (as found by DeYoung, 1998), or whether age is simply a proxy for other influences 
on the bank. We expect a negative relationship between bank age and small business lending (as also 
found by DeYoung et al., 1999). 
4.2.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, below, provides summary statistics for all variables. The median of total assets ($100 million) 
indicates that half of the banks in the sample are small, with total assets of less than $100 million. It is 
worth noting that there are significant gaps between the mean and median for the SBLTBL ratio (i.e. 85.97 
and 99.98) and those for the MBLTBL ratio (i.e. 49.02 and 37.66), respectively. This may be attributed to 
a general lack of interest by banks in lending to the very small or micro businesses.
Table 1  Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Min Max Median St. 
Deviation 
       
Loan Ratios       
SBLTBL % 
(SBL < $1000,000) 
Ratio of Small Business Loans to Total Business Loans (SBLTBL) 85.967 0 .0004 100 99.979 21.577 
MBLTBL % 
(MBL < $100,000) 
Ratio of Micro Business Loans to Total Business Loans (MBLTBL) 49.015 0 100 37.657 35.274 
Bank Size       
Total Assets* Total bank assets in billions 1 0.002 1,950 0.996 19.9 
Total Business Loans (TBL)* Total business loans of a bank in billions 0.1164 0.00001 217.7 0.01 2.1492 
9 TBL Categories = nine categories of banks categorised based on the size of their TBL of each bank 5 1 9 5 2.5821 
Small Bank (Asset-Based) = 1 if the bank's total assets are less than 1 billion dollars, = 0 otherwise 0.9391 0 1 1 0.2391 
Small Bank (TBLs-Based) = 1 if the bank's total business loans are less than 1 million dollars, = 0 otherwise 0.9427 0 1 1 0.2325 
Regional bank-market 
characteristics 
      
Market Deposit Share Bank deposit share in the local market 0.3812 0 79.909 0.0893 1.7415 
MSA Dummy = 1 if bank’s headquarters in MSA, = 0 for non-MSA 0.5493 0 1 1 0.4976 
Regional economic 
characteristics 
      
Log. GDP Per Capita Logarithm of gross domestic product per capita by state where bank is 
headquartered 
10.575 9.8318 12.089 10.642 0.2542 
Bank Characteristics       
Multi-Bank Holding Company = 1 if the bank owned by a Multi-Bank Holding Company, = 0 otherwise 0.2311 0 1 0 0.4215 
Non-Performing Loan Ratio % Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 1.4111 0 89.339 0.7172 2.3408 
Leverage %  10.600 -9.7883 294.14 9.3587 6.2890 
ROA % Return on assets 0.8952 -68.610 44.414 1.0350 1.4199 
Interest Income/Earning Assets % Ratio of total interest income as a percent of average earning assets 6.8253 0 69.065 6.9618 1.7214 
Business Loans/Total Assets % Ratio of total business loans as a percent of total assets 9.4009 0.00002 97.750 7.7606 7.4539 
Bank Age* Year of establishment – year of observation.  68.801 1 221 78 41.942 
Time Dummies Twenty dummy variables for the years 1994 – 2013 20 20 20 20 20 
No. of Observations  173,719 173,719 173,719 173,719 173,719 
Note: *Total Assets and Total Business Loans variables in this table are displayed in thousands, while converted to logarithm when included in the regressions. 
* Bank age variable is displayed by the number of years plus one, while converted to logarithm when included in the regressions.
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To conduct a preliminary descriptive analysis for our dataset, we draw two scatter plots illustrating the 
correlation between bank size and each of the SBLTBL and MBLTBL ratios. We categorise banks into 
9 peer groups based on bank asset size. Next, small business loans and micro business loans are summed 
up for all banks in each peer group and the ratios of SBLTBL and MBLTBL for each peer group over 
the period 1994 – 2013 are computed. 
The scatter plots A and B displayed in Figure 1, below, illustrate a downward slope of the best-fitted line 
across the plotted points that represent the correlation between the ratio of SBLTBL and bank size. 
Notably, the nonlinear function (displayed in green colour) is, to large degree, compatible with a linear 
one. Consistent with our hypothesis, this is indicative of a strong negative correlation between bank size 
and each of the SBLTBL and MBLTBL ratios. 
Figure 1 Correlation between SBLTBL and MBLTBL Ratios and Bank Size for 9 Groups 
 
Note: This figure includes two scatterplots of the relationship between lending propensity and 
bank size for 9 size groups of U.S banks. The scatterplot A illustrates the relationship between 
the SBLTBL ratio and bank size. The scatterplot B illustrates the relationship between the 
MBLTBL ratio and bank size. Each observation (circle) represents the lending propensity of 
a size group in a specific year.  The number of years plotted are 20 years from 1994 to 2013. 
For robustness, we split banks into 50 peer groups in order to approximate a continuous line by having 
many more categories. The scatter plots C and D in Figure 2, below, confirm the strong negative 
correlations between bank size and each of the SBLTBL and MBLTBL ratios. It is worth mentioning 
that the negative correlation seems to be slightly stronger between bank size and the very small 
businesses (i.e. micro businesses). It can be concluded that bank size is highly correlated with small and 
micro business lending. 
Figure 2 Correlation between the SBLTBL and MBLTBL Ratios and Bank Size for 50 Groups 
 
Note: This figure includes two scatterplots of the relationship between lending propensity and 
bank size for 50 size groups of U.S banks. The scatterplot C illustrates the relationship 
between the SBLTBL ratio and bank size. The scatterplot D illustrates the relationship 
between the MBLTBL ratio and bank size. Each observation (circle) represents the lending 
propensity of a size group in a specific year.  The number of years plotted are 20 years from 
1994 to 2013.  
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4.3.  Model Specification 
Our model specification examines the extent to which bank size has an effect on lending propensity to 
small and micro businesses over 20 years. To do so, we employ a fixed-effects panel data approach 
presented in the following equation:8 
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where, i represents the bank and t the year. The dependent variable is PROPNSit which represents each of 
the lending propensity ratios (i.e. SBLTBL and MBLTBL ratios). SIZEit is the size of the bank as the main 
explanatory variable of interest. The rest of the variables are control variables to account for regional 
bank-market characteristics (i.e. Market Deposit Share (MDS) and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)), 
regional economic characteristics (i.e. Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP)), and bank specific 
characteristics (i.e. Non-Performing Loans (NPL), Return on Assets (ROA), Multi-Bank Holding 
Company (MBHC), Interest Income to Earning Assets (IIEA), Business Loans to Total Loans (BLTL), 
and bank Age (AGE)). 
tYD  is the set of yearly dummy variables. iRD  is the set of bank dummy variables, 
and  
it  is the error term. The above equation is estimated twice, that is, firstly by using the SBLTBL ratio 
as a measure of lending propensity to small businesses, and secondly by using the MBLTBL ratio as a 
measure of lending propensity to microbusinesses. Subsequently, both estimations are also repeated for 
different sub-periods and subsamples as robustness regressions. 
The standard errors are robust, whereas we account for serial correlation by allowing for clustering of the 
error term at the bank level (See Petersen, 2009). Moreover, the F-statistic and Hausman tests are reported 
in the regression outcome tables to lend support to my decision on adopting fixed-effects panel approach 
over pooled and random-effects approaches. 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 Based on our panel data characteristics and statistical tests, a static fixed-effects panel data approach suits the 
empirical analysis of this paper, and hence, used to test the relationship between bank size and SME lending 
propensity. The fixed-effects model is used when the intercepts of the model are not the same for different sections or 
different time series. In this case, dummy variables can be added to the model to estimate the regression coefficients 
(e.g. Stock and Watson, 2011, p.401). The decision on using the fixed-effects model among other static models is 
taken after the computation of the F-statistic and Hausman tests. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1.  Graphical Analysis 
Before commencing the regression analysis, we consider the a priori theoretical propositions in order to 
hypothesise the expected bank lending behaviour over time. Figure 3, below, shows a theoretical graph 
with five lines, each representing the ratio of the SBLTBL or the MBLTBL of each bank size group over 
the period 1994 – 2013. As can be seen, the curves do not intersect: The graph shows that larger banks 
have a lower propensity to lend to small and micro businesses, and as banks become larger (i.e. as we 
move to the lower lines) the curve is likely to become flatter. This would be expected if our hypotheses 
are supported that 1) larger banks are less prone to lend to small firms, and 2) as banks grow and merge 
over time, their propensity to lend to small businesses also declines. The latter effect could be expected 
to be most pronounced with the very small banks. On the other hand, the largest banks may no longer 
show a noticeable change, as they do no longer increase the share of small business lending. Hence, the 
line representing their propensity to lend to small and micro businesses should stay largely constant 
overtime. These propositions are consistent with Peek and Rosengren (1998), who assert that larger banks 
do not only tend to have, on average, a smaller portfolio share of SME loans, but their share tends to 
shrink faster over time or grows more slowly. 
Figure 3 A Theoretical Graph of the MBLTBL and SBLTBL Ratios for Peer Groups 
 
Note: This graph illustrates the theoretical behaviour of bank lending to SMEs over time for 
U.S banks. Each line represents the lending propensity of each of five bank size groups over 
the period from 1994 to 2013.  
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As for the actual lending behaviour, we use the same categorisation, namely of nine bank-size groups, as 
already used in the scatter plots in the data section. Our findings are illustrated in Figure 4, below. As 
can be seen, when bank size group increases, the MBLTBL ratio decreases. There is a sharp decline (i.e. 
over 60%) as bank size exceeds 500 million of assets. In other words, small banks seem to be more 
interested in dealing with small businesses as they allocate a significantly higher proportion of their loans 
to small businesses. Over time, a slight decrease in the MBLTBL ratio for smaller banks may indicate 
decreased interest in small business lending, as these banks themselves grow over time. Yet, for larger 
banks, this ratio remains the lowest and stays fairly steady over time, suggesting an unchanged lending 
policy toward small businesses (being of little interest to large banks). 
Figure 4 Actual MBLTBL Ratio for 9 Peer Groups 
 
Note: This graph illustrates the actual behaviour of bank lending to micro businesses over 
time for U.S banks. Each line represents the lending propensity of each of nine bank size 
groups over the period from 1994 to 2013. The lending propensity to micro businesses is 
computed as the ratio of Micro Business Loans to Total Business Loans (MBLTBL) for each 
size group. 
It should be noted that it is a strong result to find that the order of the loan propensity schedules shown 
in Figure 4, above, remains essentially the same over this 20-year period.  
 
 
 
We next consider an important robustness test to meet the potential criticism that our results hide a 
different picture in the largest US cities. In Figure 5, below, the micro-business lending behaviour is 
shown for five size groups of banks solely specialised in commercial lending and headquartered in the 
largest 34 cities. As can be seen, the five size groups follow the same pattern shown in Figure 3 and 4, 
above. A lower MBLTBL ratio and a steeper decrease by the smaller groups over time can be observed. 
Figure 5 Actual MBLTBL Ratio for 5 Peer Groups of Banks in the Largest 34 Cities 
 
Note: This graph illustrates the actual behaviour of bank lending to micro businesses over 
time for U.S banks in the largest 34 U.S cities. Each line represents the lending propensity of 
each of five bank size groups over the period from 1994 to 2013. The lending propensity to 
micro businesses is computed as the ratio of Micro Business Loans to Total Business Loans 
(MBLTBL) for each size group. 
The pattern shown in Figures 3-5, above, are consistent with the findings of DeYoung (1998) and 
DeYoung et al., (1999) that the old banks become large and begin to behave more like large banks, and 
also with the findings of Berger et al., (1998), Peek and Rosengren (1998), and Karceski et al., (2005) 
that the propensity to lend to small businesses for the consolidated institution converges toward the pre-
merger ratio of the acquirer. Consequently, it seems an indisputable fact that the lending propensity of 
small banks declines over time.  
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
M
B
L
T
B
L
 R
a
ti
o
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Size < $25M Size = $75M-$250M Size = $250M-$1B
Size = $1B-$3B Size > $3B
23 
 
5.2.  Main Regression Analysis 
The following section reports the regression results of the main model, as introduced above. Prior to 
regression estimations, we perform a Hausman test to verify the use of fixed-effects approach. The test 
results reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the two estimations for all regressions, 
including robustness regressions (Hausman test statistics and their rejection probabilities are reported in 
the tables). Accordingly, we can confirm that fixed-effects estimation is consistent, while random-effects 
estimation is not.  
The first regression (Model 1) in table 2, below, models the effect of bank size on the SBLTBL ratio for 
loans with original amounts of less than $1 million, while the second regression (Model 2) models the 
effect of bank size on the MBLTBL ratio for loans with original amount less than $100,000. The key 
result in both regressions is that bank size has a significant negative effect on the SBLTBL and MBLTBL 
ratios. That is to say, the bank propensity to lend to small and micro businesses is negatively affected by 
the bank size. As bank size increases the relative share of small and micro business loans held by the 
bank diminishes. These results are consistent with the findings of Keeton, (1995), Strahan and Weston, 
(1998), Haynes et al., (1999), Berger and Udell, (2002), Berger et al., (2005), Mudd (2012), and Gilje 
(2017), that is, small banks lend more to small businesses and large banks are more advantaged in lending 
to large businesses. In this line, the findings of this paper also lend support to the claim that bank M&As 
are detrimental to small businesses by reducing the latter’s chances to secure funds (e.g. Peek and 
Rosengren, 1996; Berger et al., 1998; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2007; Francis et al., 2008; Degryse 
et al., 2011).   
Our findings refute the opposite claims that there is no effect of bank size on small business lending (e.g. 
Berger and Udell, 2006; Berger et al., 2007; De La Torre et al., 2010; Berger and Black, 2011; Berger et 
al., 2014), large banks lend more to small businesses than small banks do (e.g. Ongena et al., 2011), and 
bank consolidations help small businesses through increased lending (e.g. Strahan and Wetson, 1998; 
Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999; Black and Strahan, 2002; Erel, 2009; Jagtiani et al., 2016). 
What is more, Table 2, below, shows that most of the control variables have the expected signs. For 
instance, in both models, the multi-bank holding company coefficients show a negative sign indicating 
that banks are less interested in lending to small businesses when these banks are partially or fully owned 
by multi-bank holding companies. This can be attributed to a higher level of centralisation that may 
influence the bank lending decisions, i.e. the lending policy may be imposed by the holding company 
(e.g. Keeton, 1995) or the acquiring bank (e.g. Peek and Rosengren, 1998; Karceski et al., 2005). 
Table 2 Fixed-Effects Regressions for Model 1 and 2 All-Sample 
Variables 
Model 1 (Main Model) 
SBLTBL 
Model 2 
MBLTBL 
   
Log. Assets 
-9.541565*** 
(-90.50) 
-7.334459*** 
(-45.76) 
Non-performing Loans 
-0.1753629*** 
(-9.97) 
0.0268057 
(1.00) 
ROA 
0.1927039*** 
(6.23) 
0.2050129*** 
(4.36) 
Leverage 
-0.1520507*** 
(-21.28) 
-0.0035444 
(-0.33) 
Multi-Bank Holding Company 
-1.59743*** 
(-10.16) 
-3.54008*** 
(-14.80) 
Market Deposit Share 
0.0123119 
(0.27) 
0.5323706*** 
(7.75) 
Log. GDP per capita 
-2.107229*** 
(-3.02) 
-2.654262** 
(-2.50) 
Interest Income/Earning Assets 
0.497508*** 
(11.07) 
0.0048192 
(0.07) 
MSA 
-0.7294275* 
(-1.70) 
-6.449522*** 
(-9.86) 
Business Loans/Total Assets 
-0.4639655*** 
(-58.12) 
-0.7759058*** 
(-63.94) 
Log. Age 
-0.916927*** 
(-4.95) 
6.416471*** 
(22.81) 
Year Dummies Included Included 
Bank Dummies 
Included Included 
 
No. Observations 173,692 173,692 
No. Banks 14,453 14,453 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test statistic 973.79 1370.40 
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 
R-sq:  within   0.2259 0.3267 
R-sq:  between 0.5360 0.4612 
R-sq:  overall 0.4280 0.4250 
Note: This table reports results from Fixed-Effects estimations of the effects of bank assets on bank propensities to lend to micro 
and small business loans. The dependent variables are the measures of lending propensities to micro and small businesses, i.e. 
(1) Micro Business Loans to Total Business Loans and (2) Small Business Loans to Total Business Loans. The key independent 
variable is the logarithm of total bank assets. The period covers the years 1994 to 2013. T-statistics between parentheses. The 
symbols ***, ** and * indicate the levels of significance, 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
We used our large data set to check the influence of non-performing loans on bank lending. Consistent 
with Peek and Rosengren (1998), we find that a larger proportion of non-performing loans may negatively 
influence bank lending in general, and small business lending in particular, as NPLs can be expected to 
increase banks’ aversion to risk. Since many banks regard small business lending as risky, they may be 
more reluctant to lend to small businesses which can be a source of non-performing loans. Similarly, banks 
with a higher leverage ratio tend to reduce risky loans by lending less to potentially opaque small 
businesses.  
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On the other hand, other variables illustrate significant positive coefficients in models 1 and 2. For 
instance, a higher return on assets, increased total interest income to average earning assets, and a larger 
deposit share in the bank local market are all expected to increase the size of small business lending 
portfolios. So improved lending performance increases the share of small business loans as Carter and 
McNulty (2005) find. The positive deposit share variable indicates, as Petersen and Rajan (1995), and 
Akhigbe and McNulty (2003) assert, that a bank with greater market power is more likely to extend its 
lending to more small and micro businesses in the local markets. Contrary to Peek and Rosengren (1998), 
higher profitability, measured by return on asset ratio, increases the local supply of credit to small 
businesses. Improved bank profitability may give a space to and encourage banks to be involved in riskier 
loans as is the case with small and micro businesses.  
Concerning geography, we find that the level of a region’s urbanisation (MSA) and level of development 
(GDP) seem to have a significantly negative impact on bank lending propensity to small and micro 
businesses. Banks, especially small ones, tend to increase their lending to SMEs in more rural areas, while 
they struggle more to obtain bank finance in more urbanised regions. The negative effect of bank age on 
lending propensity to small businesses, in Model 1, is consistent with the findings of DeYoung (1998) and 
DeYoung et al., (1999). This negative impact can be attributed to changes in bank lending behaviour over 
time. That is, the old banks become large and begin to behave more like large banks. However, the positive 
effect of bank age on the lending propensity to micro businesses can be the product of U.S development 
programmes such as the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which requires large banks to allocate a 
share of their loans to micro businesses. Therefore, large banks have had to increase their lending to micro 
businesses during the sample period, i.e. 1994 – 2013. 
5.3. Testing for the Lending Capacity of Small Banks and the TBL-Based Bank Size 
In this section, we control for the fact that most of the banks in the sample are small and many of them 
are too small to make large loans.9 In addition, we examine whether it makes a difference if bank size is 
measured in terms of Total Business Loans (TBL) or total assets. We confine the analysis in this section 
to the propensity of granting small business loans, i.e. SBLTBL. 
To begin with, we re-estimate "Model 1" of Table 2 after adding a dummy variable named "Small Bank 
(Asset-Based)" equals 1 if a bank's total assets are less than $1 billion and 0 otherwise.10 This dummy 
variable absorbs any potential bias emanating from having too many small banks in our sample. As shown 
in column 2 of Table 3, the total assets coefficient slightly changes to -8.84, and hence the relationship 
                                                     
9 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for the valued suggestions concerning the robustness checks provided in 
this section.  
10 "Model 1" in Table 2 is placed as "Main Model" in Table 3 to be used as a benchmark.  
between the asset-based bank size and the SBLTBL ratio remains significant and negative. 
Moreover, researchers might argue that bank size should be measured in terms of TBL instead of total 
assets. Since the extant literature has not yet used TBL as a measure of bank size, we do so for the first 
time. Accordingly, we replace the logarithm of total assets (i.e. Log. Assets) by the logarithm of the TBL 
(i.e. Log. Business Loans) as a measure of bank size. As shown in columns 3 of Table 3, the relationship 
between the TBL-based bank size and the SBLTBL ratio is negative at -5.68 and significant. That is, as 
total business loans increases the share of small business loans declines. 
Moreover, as robustness check, we include a new variable, "9 TBL Categories", which refers to nine 
categories of banks categorised based on the size of their total business loans of each bank. As 
demonstrated in column 4 of Table 3, because of the high correlation (0.7) between the "Log. Assets" and 
the "9 TBL Categories" variables, the coefficients of two control variables have become statistically 
insignificant, i.e. "MSA" and "Log. Age". In column 5, we remove the total assets variable because of the 
high correlation. In both regressions, the relationship between the nine-TBL-categories-based bank size 
and the SBLTBL ratio remains negative and significant. This is another robustness check of our finding. 
In column 6 of Table 3, we include a new size dummy variable based on the TBL for small banks. That 
is, we add to the "Main Model" a dummy variable "Small Bank (TBL-Based)" equals 1 if a bank's TBL is 
less than $100 million, and 0 otherwise. In column 7, we replace the logarithm of total assets by the "9 
TBL Categories" variable as a measure of bank size. Despite the high correlation (0.57) between "Log. 
Assets" and "Small Bank (TBL-Based)" variables, the signs and the statistical significance of the control 
variables are not affected. Most importantly, the negative relationship between bank size and the SBLTBL 
ratio still holds in regressions 6 & 7. 
Notably, the small bank dummy variables have positive effects on the SBLTBL ratio, in columns 2, 6 & 
7 of Table 3, regardless of how bank size is measured. That means that small banks have a strong tendency 
to increase their small business loan share in their loan portfolios. Furthermore, all bank size measures 
and small bank dummy variables are statistically significant. In conclusion, whether bank size is measured 
by total assets or total business loans, the relationship between the size of the bank and the bank propensity 
to lend to small businesses is always negative and significant.
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Table 3   Fixed-Effects Regressions for the Relationship Between SBL Lending Propensity and Bank Size 
Variables Main Model 
Asset-Based 
Size Dummy 
(Total 
Assets < 1b) 
Log. TBL 
Only 
9 TBL 
Categories 
9 TBL 
Categories 
Only 
TBL-Based 
Size Dummy 
TBL<100m 
TBL-Based 
Size Dummy 
(TBL<100m) 
& 9 
Categories 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Log. Assets 
-9.541565*** 
(-90.50) 
-8.837415*** 
(-79.40) 
---- 
-6.020079*** 
(-51.83) 
---- 
-8.644101*** 
(-78.76) 
---- 
Small Bank (Asset-Based) ---- 
5.173495*** 
(19.53) 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Small Bank (TBL-Based) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
7.193791*** 
(28.57) 
13.61958*** 
(57.15) 
9 TBL Categories ---- ---- ---- 
-2.46946*** 
(-69.91) 
-3.254111*** 
(-101.11) 
---- 
-3.189218*** 
(-100.04) 
Log. Business Loans ---- ---- 
-5.679773*** 
(-111.81) 
---- ---- ---- ---- 
Non-performing Loans 
-0.1753629*** 
(-9.97) 
-0.1684346*** 
(-9.59) 
-0.1886777*** 
(-10.76) 
-0.1843423*** 
(-10.53) 
-0.1924326*** 
(-10.90) 
-0.174906*** 
(-9.97) 
-0.1964301*** 
(-11.24) 
ROA 
0.1927039*** 
(6.23) 
0.1743385*** 
(5.64) 
0.1168678*** 
(3.79) 
0.2085507*** 
(6.77) 
0.154945*** 
(4.99) 
0.1656022*** 
(5.36) 
0.1263342*** 
(4.11) 
Leverage 
-0.1520507*** 
(-21.28) 
-0.1423157*** 
(-19.89) 
-0.1350442*** 
(-19.06) 
-0.1562681*** 
(-21.99) 
-0.1101043*** 
(-15.48) 
-0.1351962*** 
(-18.90) 
-0.0997591*** 
(-14.17) 
Multi-Bank Holding Company 
-1.59743*** 
(-10.16) 
-1.626209*** 
(-10.35) 
-1.110608*** 
(-7.09) 
-1.604979*** 
(-10.25) 
-1.143565*** 
(-7.25) 
-1.560913*** 
(-9.95) 
-1.208101*** 
(-7.74) 
Market Deposit Share 
0.0123119 
(0.27) 
0.0570568 
(1.26) 
-0.3365242*** 
(-7.61) 
-0.2201122*** 
(-4.88) 
-0.765313*** 
(-17.30) 
0.0665334 
(1.47) 
-0.5044551*** 
(-11.46) 
Log. GDP per capita 
-2.107229*** 
(-3.02) 
-2.041957*** 
(-2.93) 
-1.910878*** 
(-2.75) 
-1.376245** 
(-1.98) 
-2.117993*** 
(-3.02) 
-1.997832*** 
(-2.87) 
-1.36162** 
(-1.96) 
Interest Income/Earning Assets 
0.497508*** 
(11.07) 
0.4847013*** 
(10.79) 
0.6674806*** 
(15.02) 
0.482337*** 
(10.86) 
0.5906083*** 
(13.21) 
0.4728188*** 
(10.54) 
0.5941117*** 
(13.42) 
MSA 
-0.7294275* 
(-1.70) 
-0.9746526* 
(-2.27) 
-2.880427*** 
(-6.76) 
-0.5939169 
(-1.39) 
-3.165732*** 
(-7.38) 
-1.017202*** 
(-2.37) 
-2.665651*** 
(-6.28) 
Business Loans/Total Assets 
-0.4639655*** 
(-58.12) 
-0.4651371*** 
(-58.34) 
---- ---- ---- 
-0.4316865*** 
(-53.68) 
---- 
Log. Age 
-0.916927*** 
(-4.95) 
-1.233741*** 
(-6.65) 
-3.42985*** 
(-19.88) 
-0.2165991 
(-1.18) 
-3.433437*** 
(-19.74) 
-1.044037*** 
(-5.65) 
-2.791257*** 
(-16.17) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Bank Dummies 
Included Included Included Included Included 
 
Included Included 
No. Observations 173,692 173,692 173,693 173,693 173,693 173,693 173,693 
No. Banks 14,453 14,453 14,453 14,453 14,453 14,453 14,453 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-sq:  within   0.2259 0.2277 0.2304 0.2330 0.2201 0.2298 0.2357 
R-sq:  between 0.5360 0.5384 0.4297 0.5287 0.3945 0.5491 0.4839 
R-sq:  overall 0.4280 0.4307 0.3649 0.4224 0.3342 0.4373 0.3967 
Note: This table reports results from Fixed-Effects estimations of the effects of bank size on bank propensity to lend to Small Business Loans, SBL. The dependent variable is the 
measures of lending propensity to small businesses, i.e. Small Business Loans to Total Business Loans, SBLTBL. The key independent variable in the "Main Model" is the 
logarithm of total bank assets (i.e. Log. Assets). In column 2, the "Main Model" is re-estimated after including a dummy variable, "Small Bank, Asset-Based", equals 1 if a bank's 
total assets are less than $1 billion, and 0 otherwise. In column 3, the "Log. Assets" is replaced by the logarithm of the TBL (i.e. Log. Business Loans). In column 4, a variable 
called "9 TBL Categories" is added to the "Main Model", it has nine categories based on the size of the TBL. In column 5, the "Log. Assets" is removed from the "Main Model" 
and the "9 TBL Categories" is added. In column 6, a dummy variable, "Small Bank, BL-Based", is add to the "Main Model", it equals to 1 if a bank's TBL is less than $100 
million, and 0 otherwise. In column 7, the "Log. Assets" is replaced by the "9 TBL Categories", and the "Small Bank (TBL-Based)" is added.  The period covers the years 1994 
to 2013. T-statistics between parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate the levels of significance, 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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5.4.  Testing for the Impact of the 2008 Crisis 
In order to test for the impact of the 2008 banking crisis and to rule out the possibility that the recent 
financial crisis may be biasing our results, we break the sample period into two sub-periods 1994-2007 
and 2008-2013, and then run the same models for each period. Regression results in Table 4, below, show 
that bank size coefficients change marginally during the period before the credit crisis compared to the 
all-sample coefficients (i.e. -8.62 and -7.85 respectively). As for the years during the crisis, there are also 
slight economic changes, where the SBLTBL ratio coefficient decreases by 1.17% while it is slightly more 
considerable for the MBLTBL ratio by 1.69%. However, the impact of bank size on the two ratios remains 
statistically significant for pre and post crisis as well as all-sample periods. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the results from the all-sample regressions are robust and hence the inverse relationship between bank 
size and bank propensities toward small and micro business lending seems not to have been substantially 
influenced by the 2008 credit crisis. 
Table 4  Fixed-Effects Regressions for Pre and Post the 2008 Credit Crisis: 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
SBLTBL 
Model 2 
MBLTBL 
Model 3 
SBLTBL 
Model 4 
MBLTBL 
 1994 – 2007 2008 – 2013 
     
Log. Assets 
-8.62239*** 
(-68.31) 
-7.854647*** 
(-37.91) 
-7.457246*** 
(-19.79) 
-6.169715*** 
(-14.11) 
Non-performing Loans 
-.0335493 
(-1.28) 
-.0577149 
(-1.34) 
.0316545 
(1.08) 
.0738509** 
(2.17) 
ROA 
.1568539*** 
(3.96) 
.2488841*** 
(3.83) 
.0229563 
(0.43) 
.0265731 
(0.43) 
Leverage 
-.1270777*** 
(-16.07) 
-.0202912 
(-1.56) 
-.0732918*** 
(-3.27) 
-.0060452 
(-0.23) 
Multi-Bank Holding 
Company 
-1.728474*** 
(-10.13) 
-3.386097*** 
(-12.09) 
-1.39424*** 
(-2.62) 
-2.349929*** 
(-3.80) 
Market Deposit Share 
-.0225343 
(-0.44) 
.6479314*** 
(7.65) 
-.0048923 
(-0.04) 
.1447121 
(1.07) 
Log. GDP per capita 
-3.22378*** 
(-3.45) 
-2.961471* 
(-1.93) 
-.7968813 
(-0.57) 
-2.726113* 
(-1.69) 
Interest Income/Earning 
Assets 
.2999385*** 
(6.39) 
-.0329389 
(-0.43) 
.4693207*** 
(3.23) 
.6368938*** 
(3.78) 
MSA 
1.358602*** 
(2.64) 
-6.832038*** 
(-8.10) 
-2.668207* 
(-1.76) 
-4.438309** 
(-2.53) 
Business Loans/Total 
Assets 
-.3569564*** 
(-39.96) 
-.764582*** 
(-52.15) 
-.9698446*** 
(-42.42) 
-.8219291*** 
(-31.00) 
Log. age 
-.0637153 
(-0.26) 
5.895814*** 
(14.93) 
.4642277 
(0.70) 
7.323071*** 
(9.56) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Bank Dummies 
Included Included 
 
Included Included 
No. Observations 129,729 129,729 43,963 43,963 
No. Banks 14,133 14,133 8,183 8,183 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test statistic 518.63 601.94 313.72 451.05 
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Hausman test 
(Prob>chi2) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-sq:  within   0.1610 0.2578 0.0849 0.0663 
R-sq:  between 0.5027 0.4672 0.4948 0.3437 
R-sq:  overall 0.4076 0.4104 0.4190 0.3001 
Note: This table reports results from Fixed-Effects estimations of the effects of bank assets on bank propensities to lend to micro 
and small business loans. The dependent variables are the measures of lending propensities to micro and small businesses, i.e. 
(1) Micro Business Loans to Total Business Loans and (2) Small Business Loans to Total Business Loans. The key independent 
variable is the logarithm of total bank assets. The regression models (1) to (2) contain results for the period prior to the 2008 
financial crisis, i.e. 1994-2007. Regression models (3) to (4) contain results for the period followed the 2008 financial crisis, i.e. 
2008-2013. T-statistics between parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate the levels of significance, 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.  
5.5.  Robustness Tests 
In order to ensure equal exposure of all bank types and sizes to similar market characteristics, we 
repeatedly re-estimate the same MBL and SBL models after having the dataset restricted to banks with 
more homogenous market and economic characteristics (i.e. only urban areas) and merely specialised in 
commercial banking. This sequence of regressions ensures robust conclusions of the impact of bank size 
on micro and small business lending propensities. 
As for the first robustness regression, we exclude all banks that are headquartered in non-MSAs (i.e. 
rural counties), limiting our dataset to banks headquartered in counties that are part of MSAs, that is, 
banks headquartered in urban areas. As a result, the number of observations declined by approximately 
45% with 8,938 banks remaining from the main sample. Secondly, we further limit our sample to banks 
solely specialised in commercial lending and rerun the same regressions. Finally, we re-estimate the same 
MBL and SBL models using the subsample of banks in the largest 34 U.S cities. The final subsample 
consists of 912 banks with 7,188 observations. Since all banks in the robustness regressions are 
headquartered in MSAs, we drop the MSA variable from the three additional regressions.  
Tables 5 and 6, below, summarise and compare the outcomes of the baseline regression and the additional 
three robustness regressions for the effect of bank size on the SBLTBL and MBLTBL ratios, respectively. 
Table 5 shows that the negative effect of bank size on the SBLTBL ratio remains statistically and 
economically significant, with a coefficient slightly increasing across the four regressions, from 9.54 to 
11.69 %. Table 6 indicates that although the size effect on the MBLTBL ratio decreases from -7.33% to 
-2.1%, the effect remains negative as well as statistically and economically significant. It is worth noting 
that as we restrict our sample to banks located in urbanised and denser areas, the effect of bank size on 
the SBLTBL ratio increases, while it decreases for the MBLTBL ratio. Such patterns can be attributable 
to two correlating reasons; firstly, a smaller presence of smaller banks in the largest, densest cities in the 
United States. Secondly, smaller banks seem to become more prone, in the denser areas, to increase the 
size of their small business loans by targeting larger and more secure businesses than micro, opaque 
businesses. That is, those banks tend less to disperse their small business loans in order to reduce the 
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due-diligence, transactions, and monitoring costs. 
Table 5  Comparison between Baseline and Robustness Regressions for SBL Model  
 
Variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Log. Assets 
-9.541565*** 
(-90.50) 
-9.661569*** 
(-65.74) 
-9.848837*** 
(-47.62) 
-11.68784*** 
(-20.47) 
Non-performing Loans 
-.1753629*** 
(-9.97) 
-.1584559*** 
(-6.80) 
-.0694681** 
(-2.35) 
-.0926968 
(-1.20) 
ROA 
.1927039*** 
(6.23) 
.1722361*** 
(4.46) 
.2166824*** 
(4.03) 
.2269533* 
(1.68) 
Leverage 
-.1520507*** 
(-21.28) 
-.1364262*** 
(-15.80) 
-.1415178*** 
(-9.66) 
-.2791901*** 
(-6.32) 
Multi-Bank Holding 
Company 
-1.59743*** 
(-10.16) 
-2.312771*** 
(-9.89) 
-2.444052*** 
(-8.28) 
-4.813207*** 
(-5.19) 
Market Deposit Share 
.0123119 
(0.27) 
.0932253* 
(1.83) 
.2947704*** 
(2.59) 
.7280725*** 
(3.17) 
Log. GDP per capita 
-2.107229*** 
(-3.02) 
-2.194682** 
(-2.26) 
-1.359292 
(-1.09) 
-1.31404 
(-0.43) 
Interest Income/Earning 
Assets 
.497508 
(11.07) *** 
.5650747*** 
(9.01) 
.324623*** 
(3.38) 
.6744221** 
(2.37) 
MSA 
-.7294275* 
(-1.70) 
---- ---- ---- 
Business Loans/Total 
Assets 
-.4639655*** 
(-58.12) 
-.4768992*** 
(-44.01) 
-.4719874*** 
(-35.74) 
-.5414475*** 
(-15.71) 
Log. age 
-.916927*** 
(-4.95) 
-.2736665 
(-1.13) 
2.121389*** 
(6.80) 
1.348041 
(1.38) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Bank Dummies 
Included Included 
 
Included Included 
No. Observations 173,692 95,393 57,128 7,188 
No. Banks 14,453 8,938 6,577 912 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test statistic 973.79 581.86 258.28 64.86 
Hausman test 
(Prob>chi2) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-sq:  within   0.2259 0.2415 0.2706 0.2789 
R-sq:  between 0.5360 0.5567 0.5340 0.6261 
R-sq:  overall 0.4280 0.4568 0.4465 0.5499 
Note: This table reports results from Fixed-Effects estimations of the effects of bank assets on bank propensities to lend to small 
business loans.. The dependent variable is the measure of lending propensity to small businesses, i.e. the Small Business Loans 
to Total Business Loans. The key independent variable is the logarithm of total bank assets. The regression model (1) contains 
results including banks in all counties. The regression model (2) contains results including banks in MSA Counties only. The 
regression model (3) contains results including only commercial banks in MSA counties only. The regression model (4) contains 
results including only commercial banks in the largest cities only. The period covers the years 1994 to 2013. T-statistics between 
parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate the levels of significance, 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
The state development initiatives to support small businesses, such as those run by the U.S Small 
Business Administration (SBA) and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), 
introduced in 1953 and 1977, respectively, may have alleviated the negative effect of bank size on micro 
business loan share at large banks.   
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The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requires banks with asset size over $300 million to report to 
the FFIEC their small business loans in order to encourage larger banks to allocate a greater share of 
their loans to small businesses. One-third of the banks in the subsample have assets greater than $300 
million. Therefore, the decline in the coefficient of the effect of bank size on the MBLTBL ratio could 
be mainly attributed to such initiatives.  
Table 6  Comparison between Bassline and Robustness Regressions for MBL Model  
 
Variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Log. Assets 
-7.334459*** 
(-45.76) 
-5.172862*** 
(-27.56) 
-4.310591*** 
(-20.75) 
-2.103479*** 
(-4.75) 
Non-performing Loans 
0.0268057 
(1.00) 
-0.0122925 
(-0.41) 
0.0140835 
(0.47) 
0.0318352 
(0.53) 
ROA 
.2050129*** 
(4.36) 
0.0521211 
(1.06) 
0.165622*** 
(3.07) 
0.076485 
(0.73) 
Leverage 
-0.0035444 
(-0.33) 
0.0264224** 
(2.40) 
-0.031319** 
(-2.13) 
0.0007443 
(0.02) 
Multi-Bank Holding 
Company 
-3.54008*** 
(-14.80) 
-2.762401*** 
(-9.25) 
-1.539053*** 
(-5.19) 
-2.274027*** 
(-3.17) 
Market Deposit Share 
0.532371*** 
(7.75) 
0.3838*** 
(5.91) 
0.844012*** 
(7.37) 
0.528763*** 
(2.97) 
Log. GDP per capita 
-2.654262** 
(-2.50) 
-1.30609 
(-1.05) 
-0.4454841 
(-0.36) 
-3.163668 
(-1.33) 
Interest 
Income/Earning Assets 
0.0048192 
(0.07) 
0.1004549 
(1.25) 
0.380559*** 
(3.95) 
.4371092** 
(1.98) 
MSA 
-6.449522*** 
(-9.86) 
---- ---- ---- 
Business Loans/Total 
Assets 
-0.775906*** 
(-63.94) 
-0.669536*** 
(-48.37) 
-0.439123*** 
(-33.10) 
-0.338486*** 
(-12.67) 
Log. age 
6.416471*** 
(22.81) 
5.173096*** 
(16.73) 
2.446076*** 
(7.80) 
-0.4213027 
(-0.56) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Bank Dummies 
Included Included 
 
Included Included 
No. Observations 173,692 95,393 57,128 7,188 
No. Banks 14,453 8,938 6,577 912 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test statistic 1370.40 1288.07 851.34 95.90 
Hausman test 
(Prob>chi2) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-sq:  within   0.3267 0.3115 0.2834 0.2174 
R-sq:  between 0.4612 0.3621 0.2686 0.3142 
R-sq:  overall 0.4250 0.3740 0.2811 0.2853 
Note: This table reports results from Fixed-Effects estimations of the effects of bank assets on bank propensities to lend to Micro 
business loans. The dependent variable is the measure of lending propensity to micro businesses, i.e. the Micro Business Loans 
to Total Business Loans. The key independent variable is the logarithm of total bank assets. The regression model (1) contains 
results including banks in all counties. The regression model (2) contains results including banks in MSA counties only. The 
regression model (3) contains results including only commercial banks in MSA counties only. The regression model (4) contains 
results including only commercial banks in the largest cities only. The period covers the years 1994 to 2013. T-statistics between 
parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate the levels of significance, 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
From the above robustness tests, we know that the regression results from the main sample – that large 
banks are more prone to issue large loans to large businesses and small banks more prone to service small 
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firms – remains robust when controlling for different market and economic conditions by focusing on 
banks in urban areas. 
6. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to examine the impact of bank size on the propensity of banks to lend to 
small and micro businesses in a way that deals with the plethora of contradictory findings and thus 
resolves this question, at least for the case of the largest banking system in the world, that of the United 
States of America. We do so by 1) using the so far largest and most representative dataset, consisting of 
essentially all banks, and over a long time span, covering the two decades from 1994 to 2013; 2) 
introducing two new measures of the bank propensity to lend to small businesses, namely, the ratio of 
small business loans to total business loans and the ratio of micro business loans to total business loans, 
which, surprisingly, had so far not been used in the literature, although being theoretically superior. Given 
these improvements, prior diverging empirical results could have been due to the biases of the datasets 
and methods used.  
Our findings revealed a clear, consistent and highly significant inverse relationship between bank size 
and the relative share of small and micro business loans issued by banks. In other words, the propensity 
of banks to lend to small businesses decreases as the size of the banks become larger, and vice versa. The 
results hold for the sub-periods before and during the 2008 financial crisis, as well as for banks that are 
only specialised in commercial lending and operate in a more homogeneous environment with respect to 
market and economic conditions, proving the robustness of our findings. Since our sample consists of all 
domestically active and inactive banks which the FDIC has insured over the past two decades, the results 
support the original conventional wisdom on this question, and contrast with Berger and Black (2007), 
Erel (2009), and Berger and Black (2011). The findings hold for the United States of America, which 
possesses one of the largest economies in the world and is home to the largest number of banks in any 
one country. As a result, it is likely that the findings are also relevant for other countries, but further 
research is needed for confirmation, deploying our methodology. 
The findings are likely to have policy implications for the industrial organisation of the banking sector 
in the US. It is well known that the vast majority of firms consists of small and very small firms. These 
firms also account for the majority of employment, and any given amount of money invested in such 
small firms tends to create more jobs than the same amount invested in a large or very large firm. Policy-
makers have in recent years emphasised the importance of ensuring adequate funding of SMEs in a 
number of countries. Small firms are not usually able to tap capital markets and are therefore dependent 
on borrowing from banks. The research presented in this paper shows that such bank funding is only 
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likely to be forthcoming, if the economy is characterised by a large number of small banks.  
In this paper the largest empirical examination hitherto existing on a fundamental issue concerning the 
importance of the structure of the banking sector was presented. Should the results of our empirical 
examination of the largest and most diverse banking sector in the world receive support in other countries, 
this would imply that banking systems that do not include a significant proportion of small banks, such 
as that of the U.K, will hamper the growth of small businesses and record weaker job creation than 
systems, such as that in the U.S. (or indeed Germany), with a large number of small and community 
banks, which appear more supportive of small firms. On the basis of our findings it is not unreasonable 
to speculate that a key barrier to growth of SMEs could possibly be overcome by influencing the structure 
of the banking system such that it is dominated by a large number of small, local banks, as is the case in 
the U.S and Germany (the latter boasting export volumes rivalling those of China, more than half of 
which are due to SMEs), but distinctly not so in the United Kingdom (Werner, 2013a, b). The role of 
banks lending for productive investment in economic development may have been understated in prior 
research in economics, as their role as creators of the money supply was not recognised (Werner, 1997; 
2016). Chinese economic development may be another case in point: When Deng Xiao Ping rose to 
influence in 1978, the centralistic Soviet system was changed and thousands of small and medium-sized 
banks (as well as fewer large banks) were newly created, forming a decentralised banking system with 
many small banks making decisions about the credit creation and allocation locally. Economic growth 
took off and recorded four decades of double-digit growth. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, sticking to a 
highly concentrated banking system, collapsed.  
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